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CURRENT TESTS OF SIMILARITY IN INFRINGEMENT PRO-
CEEDINGS*
INTRODUCTION
Since man first began to reduce his creative thoughts to concrete
form, society has been torn between two conflicting impulses-the
desire to protect the author's property right in his creation, and the
wish to benefit by the broadest diffusion of created ideas.' Evolving
from the union of these two impulses, and deeply rooted in the com-
mon law, modern copyright legislation originated in England with the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1709.2 The first copyright act in the
United States, adopted in 1790, gave protection to authors for a period
of fourteen years with a right of renewal for a similar period.3 The
1947 codification carried over the time limit of twenty-eight years
with the renewal privilege.
4
Authority for the Copyright Act5 is provided by Article 1, § 8, cl. 8
of the Constitution, allowing Congress the power:
... to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....
From this broad language, the question necessarily arises as to what
the Founders intended to protect as a "writing"; i.e., what is the nature
of a literary right?
This problem has long taxed the verbal ability of the judiciary, and
it has come to be generally recognized that the concept does not lend
itself to adequate definition. One attempt, by Lord Mansfield in 1769,
stated that:
The property in the copy, thus abridged, is equally an incorporeal
right to print a set of intellectual ideas or modes of thinking, com-
municated in a set of words and sentences and mode of expression.
Entered in the Nathan Burkan ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW ComP ITIoN, AUGUSr, 1968.
1. Yankwich, The Legal Protection of Ideas, 43 U. VA. L. REv. 375 (1957).
2. 8 Anne c. 21 (1709) (repealed).
3. Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952).
5. 17 U.S.C. (Supp. 1950), formerly 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
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It is equally detached from the manuscript, or any physical ex-
istence whatsoever.6
Mansfield's description was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Holmes v. Hurst.
The right thus secured by the Copyright Act is not a right to the
use of certain words, because they are the common property of
the human race, and are as little susceptible of private appropria-
tion as air and sunlight; nor is the right to ideas alone, since in
the absence of means of communicating them they are of value
to no one but the author. But the right is to that arrangement of
words which the author has selected to express his ideas.8
Thus, the author's literary right extends only to his arrangement of
ideas. However, the proposition is not that simple, for, according to
Justice Story, to distinguish between a bare idea and the expression of
that idea approaches the realm of metaphysics? Further confusion oc-
curs when it is considered that although a copyright protects the means
of expressing an idea, if the same idea can be expressed in a plurality
of different means, a plurality of copyrights may result and no infringe-
ment will exist.10 Hence the problem faced by the courts in enforcing
the Copyright Act is twofold:
(1) What constitutes copyrightable material?
(2) What constitutes infringement?
As a discussion of the former issue would mainly consist of summariz-
ing a large group of rather vague quotations,1" the purpose of this dis-
6. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 251 (K.B. 1769).
7. 174 U.S. 82 (1879).
8. Id. at 86.
9. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4, 901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184i);
10. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926). See Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins.
Co., 99 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1930). See also 119 A.L.R. 1250; Christianson v. West Publishers, 149
F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. The cases are too numerous and too conflicting for intelligent generalization.
Compare O'Brien: v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13 (N.Y. 1946) (idea that a
motion picture be built around the story of the Palace Theater in New York, coupled
with four brief suggestions for story treatment held insufficiently concrete); Alberts
v. Remington Rand, 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.YS.2d 892 (1940) (written suggestion that
defendant company produce and distribute to its customers a graph of the direction
1968]
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cussion will be to evaluate the methods and evidence utilized by the
courts in arriving at the determination of whether or not infringement
has occurred. In doing so, it must be realized that the uncertainties in
the law of copyright, coupled with the large amounts often involved
in litigation, have given rise to a great number of baseless claims.2 The
courts have been aware not only of the frequency of these unfounded
claims, but also of the social desirability of keeping creative writers
reasonably free of the fear of lawsuits. Thus, in an effort to protect
this privilege, there is some concern that they may have in certain re-
spects unduly restricted the rights granted by the Copyright Act. 3
INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS-PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF
Once a plaintiff in infringement proceedings has proven that he did
obtain a copyright on his work, it is the function of the court to de-
termine what part of his work the copyright actually protects and be-
yond that, whether the work allegedly infringing the copyrighted ma-
terial is so similar that the author's property right has been abridged.
In this respect, it must be shown that: (1) defendant had access to
plaintiff's copyrighted work; (2) plaintiff's work was original; and (3)
the two works are identical to a degree that a presumption of copying
is raised. The issues of whether or not the work was copyrighted, and
of whether or not the alleged infringer had access are fact questions
to be decided by the jury. Then, once the court has determined the
in which the hair on an individual's face grows held too abstract); and Thomas v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A.2d 61 (1944) (proposal that defendant
advertise that its cigarettes burned approximately twice as long as competing brands
held to warrant no compensation); with Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101
Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935) (letter embodying an idea for an advertisement
in which a well-groomed gentleman offers a cigarette to his colleague who was to
spurn the offer with the remark, "No thanks, I smoke Chesterfields," held sufficiently
concrete); and Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1941)
(program outline entitled "Racketeer and Co." containing plans for a radio show
featuring a district attorney at war with the underworld held protectible in a suit
against the producers of "Mr. District Attorney.")
12. See Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1946).
13. See Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. Rv. 1125 (1951).
This problem is an old one; in the words of Lord Mansfield:
• . . [W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prej-
udicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for
the service of the community may not be deprived of their just merits;
and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded. Cary v. Longman, 1 East 358, 362, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 (K.B.
1801).
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original portions of the plaintiff's work that may be entitled to legal
protection, the question of similarity between these portions and the
alleged infringing material goes to the jury.14 Problems of proving ac-
cess and originality are not too difficult, as they depend upon the ex-
istence of events (often stipulated) which can be clearly tested by
resort to specific law and fact.' 5 However, a short discussion of these
elements, prior to examining the more important area of proving simi-
larity, would be beneficial.
Access
An action for infringement does not fail merely because the defend-
ant was not discovered in the actual act of copying. Obviously, if a
work has been published and is in general circulation, that is, available
for perusal by the public at large, a strong inference of access will
arise.'6 For this reason, the point is generally conceded by defendant.
The question is more difficult, of course, if the work has not been
generally distributed.' 7
Access has also been held to constitute evidence of similarity,' s
though it must be kept in mind that it will not substitute for a lack of
proof of copying, and there is no question that the degree of similarity
necessary for infringement is not diminished by proof of access. 19 Con-
versely, since it is dependent upon defendant's opportunity to copy and
similarities present in the two works, it has been held that the greater
the similarities, the easier it is to prove access. 0 In this instance, plain-
14. See Carman, The Function of the Judge and Jury in the "Literary Property Law-
suit," 42 CALIF. L. Rav. 52 (1954).
15. See Sorenson & Sorenson, Re-examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary
Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CoRNs. L. Q. 638 (1952).
16. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Wilkie v. Sandy Bros., 91 F.2d
978 (2d Cir. 1937), aff'd on rehearing 94 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 735 (1938); Golding v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950).
17. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893, (8th
Cir. 1946).
18. See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938);
O'Rourke v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 44 F.Supp. 480 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
19. Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187 (2d Cir. 1961).
20. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
It is obvious that proof of access and similarity are greatly intertwined:
Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will
suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of access and similarities exist,
then the trier of facts must determine whether the similarities are suffi-
cient to prove copying . . . If evidence of access is absent, the similari-
ties must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and
1968]
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tiff's task is facilitated, since access need not be established by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.2'
Originality
Non-original works are excluded from protection by Section 8 of
the Copyright Act. Originality does not require that the author's work
be novel,23 for it is sufficient if it is the product of the author's inde-
pendent industry or an elaboration of material already in the public
domain.24
Theoretically, the essence of creative originality lies in the mode in
which the conflict at the basis of every dramatic work finds expres-
sion.25 Thus, the criterion used by the courts in determining originality
has been not the newness of ideas, but their distinctive development.26
Here again, the law suffers for want of an adequate definition, for
though a plot is certainly more developed than an idea, it is generally
considered non-copyrightable.27 Since there are only thirty-six funda-
mental plots available to writers,28 all well-used since the time of Homer,
defendant independently arrived at the same results. Id. at 468.
In addition, several types of evidence, such as common errors, or identity of phrase-
ology, used to prove similarity, may also be used in proving access.
21. Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting System, 221 P.2d 108, 113 (Cal. 1950).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
23. See Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956) (dictum); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Ci. 1951) (dictum). See also Cham-
berlin v. Uris Sales Corp, 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) (dictum); Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 790 (1945).
24. However, copyright protection does not extend to works solely in the public
domain.
25. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457 (1951).
Dramatic creation, whether in the form of plays, novels, or stories, con-
sists in so arranging ordinary happenings or matters of common experience
and portraying human characters that a light suffuses them which turns
them into patterns of universal experience. In this realm, orginality lies.
Id. at 485.
26. See H. BALiL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND Ln-ITRARY PROPERTY, §§ 108-110 (1944).
27. It is generally agreed that copyright law does not protect the plot of an author,
but only his embellishments of it. London v. Biograph Co., 231 Fed. 696 (2d Cir. 1916).
A certain amount of confusion exists, at least regarding dramatic works, as to whether
"idea," "theme," and "piot" mean the same thing. See Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), which held that the three men mean
the same. See also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) (plot
and theme are identical); Underhill v. Belasco, 254 Fed. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (ideas
are uncopyrightable but a theme may be protected); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1928) (plots may be protected).
28. All these plots were codified by Georges Polti in his work entitled THE TIrY-
Six DRAMATiC SrruATIoNs (1940).
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it is actually impossible for an author to develop an original plot, al-
though one court has recognized that a writer might create such a unique
series of events that the very use of the plot itself would result in
plagiarism.- Thus, only the author's embellishment of whichever of
the thirty-six fundamental plots he has chosen is protected.30
In addition, the infringing work and the infringed work may have
both been based upon a common source, such as an historical event.31
An author would be barred from obtaining a copyright on an event in
history, nor could he support an infringement action on certain scenes
which the infringing author would quite naturally include in his work.
For example, a claim was made that the motion picture, "The Harvey
Girls" infringed upon two stories, "Cupid Rides the Rails" and "Old
John Santa Fe." 32 The picture and stories were based on waitresses
employed by the Harvey eating houses in the Southwest at the turn
of the century. The court recognized that there were similar incidents
in the productions, but it held that such similarities were due to the
nature of the subject matter and not to copying. Both the picture and
stories were set in the same geographical area and both had the typical
western background, including individual characters in the stereotyped
role of hero, heroine and villain. "Considering that both the movie
and the manuscript presented activities of Harvey Girls, and infor-
mation concerning them was received from the same source, we think
it reasonable that some similarities in character portrayal could be dis-
covered." 3 Certain similarities may also be inherent in certain situa-
tions, the result being that in the progression of the story line, identical
scenes are bound to appear. Thus, an author cannot claim originality
in his succession of events when the plot he has used tends to dictate
that these events must occur.
An author's characterization may provide a basis for originality, al-
29. Darn v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910).
30. Plot ideas were considered as not copyrightable in the following cases: Rosen
v. Loew's Inc., 162 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1947) (burning of Jewish books and hostility
of German students toward Jewish teachers in Nazi Germany); Bein v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 105 F.2d 969, 970 (2d Cir. 1939) (life in a reform school); Macdonald
v. Du Maurier, 75 F. Supp. 655, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (second wife living in home
formerly occupied by her husband and his first wife); Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1930) (murder in theater during performance).
31. See Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 140 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Cal. 1956);
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc, 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
32. Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843
(1954) rehearing denied, 348 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
33. Id. at 189.
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though the less developed the characters, the less chance that they may
be copyrightable.3 4 Ordinarily characters must have a personalized be-
ing and possess individual personalities, or embody distinctive quali-
ties.35 However, it has been recognized that the use made of well-known
characters may be subject to copyright. 6
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a sec-
ond comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as
to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his char-
acters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort
of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amor-
ous of his mistress 7
Generally, most copyrighted works are, in essence, expansions and
variations of previous works. It is only when the author is able to em-
bellish his plot of characters in a unique manner that his claim of
originality will be allowed.
Originality in dramatic composition does not attach to ideas. But
it may attach to combinations of ideas, to their development
through incidents and the interplay of characters and to that skill
which turns an ordinary incident into a distinctive one, to achieve
an original result. The result may not be considered a great crea-
tion, by high standards of literary criticism. But if it has these indi-
vidual characteristics, it is original and the courts will recognize it
as such.3 8
Evidence of Similarities
The issue, once questions of access and non-existence of independent
effort have been satisfied, is: "are there similarities of matters which
34. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
35. Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
36. Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (dictum).
37. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 at 121 (2d Cir. 1930) cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
38. Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, supra note 25, at
469. Accord, Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1936); O'Brien v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Bowen v. Yankee Network,
46 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Mass. 1942); Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458 (1874). But see, Golding
v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950); Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950); Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
32 Cal.App.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371 (1939). Cf., Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E.
56 (1930).
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justify the infringement claim? Was there a piracy of a copyrightable
play, as shown by similarities of locale, characters, and incidents?" 39
Generally, the court will determine whether or not there is an issue
of similarity before submitting it to the jury. Once the question is be-
fore the jury, the best evidence of similarity between the two works
are the works themselves.40 Except for the few jurisdictions allowing
it probative force,4' expert evidence is generally not admissible for any
purpose.4 Exclusion has resulted from the fear that, by dissection,
abstraction, and analysis, the most dissimilar topics may be synthesized
into a theme to show identity. This view is apparently based upon a
statement made by Judge Learned Hand in the case of Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures.43
We cannot approve of the length of the record, which was due
chiefly to the use of expert witnesses. Argument is argument
whether in box or bar, and its proper place is the last. The testi-
mony of an expert upon such issues, especially his cross-examina-
tion, greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot
be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not be
allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal,
it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court
is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely
it is to stand upon the firmer, more naive, ground of its considered
impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of
cases such evidence may in the future be entirely excluded, and
the case confined to the actual issues; that is, whether the copy-
righted work was original, and whether the defendant copied it, so
far as the supposed infringement is identical.4 4 (Emphasis added.)
The holding in Nichols specifically rejected the use of Malevinsky's
analytical tests proposed in the lower court.4 5 As counsel for the plain-
tiff (Nichols), Malevinsky contended that defendant's motion picture
entitled "The Cohens and the Kellys" infringed her copyrighted play,
"Abie's Irish Rose." His tests involved the segregation of scenes of the
39. Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938).
40. See Carman, supra note 14.
41. See Sorenson & Sorenson, supra note 15.
42. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 (1930).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 123.
45. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1928). See MALEviNstY, TbE
SCIENCE OF PLAYWRMNG, (1925).
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play and picture, and the comparison of ideas or emotions forming the
collocation of the two works. The theory was that if these be similar,
the underlying ideas, emotional themes, basic characters, and "the
crucible" must be similar. Hence, infringement would exist. However,
the court rejected the tests on the ground that they merely showed a
similarity of emotions, which, like ideas, are not entitled to copyright
*46 Nprotection. Since Nichols, other types of expert evidence, such as
critical analysis, 47 parallel comparisons, 4 8 and dissection 49 have also been
rejected. However, parallel column analysis has been approved, at least
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York "when it
is utilized in the determination of the issue of copying but not when
it is offered with respect to the issue of unlawful appropriation or sub-
stantiality or materiality." 50
The adverse reaction toward expert evidence has no doubt arisen
from the feeling that copyrighted works are written for impression
upon the lay reader or listener rather than for the few critics or ex-
perts in the arts.51 Although drawn from an 1868 opinion, 52 the "ordi-
nary observer test" has always been of rather dubious origin.53 How-
ever, there is no doubt that it is well-established today in its application
46. Id. at 147. These tests were also specifically rejected in Lewys v. O'Neill, 49
F.2d 603, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
47. Twentieth-Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944);
Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933).
48. Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1941); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Wit-
wer, 65 F.2d 1, 32 (9th Cir. 1933).
49. Universal Pictures Corp. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir.
1947).
50. Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Heim v. Universal Pic-
tures Corp., 154 F.2d 480, 488, n. 9 (2d Cir. 1946); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
468 (2d Cir. 1946).
51. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551
(9th Cir. 1941); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
52. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (No. 3,552) (S.D.N.Y. 1868), holding that the
standards for determining similarity is whether the two works are
recognized by the spectator, through any of the senses to which repre-
sentation is addressed, as conveying substantially the same impressions to
and exciting the same emotions in the mind in the same sequence or order.
id. at 1138.
53. At least one writer feels that there is nothing in the opinion (cases supra note 47)
to indicate that there can be no dissection or analysis in considering the signficance
of sensory impressions. Thus it may be that the court merely intended to point up
the principle that elements appealing to any of the senses may command copyright
protection. See Nimmer, supra note 13.
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to all types of copyright infringement action.54 Federal District Courts
using the ordinary observer test include the southern district of New
York, the southern district of California, and the Second and Ninth
Circuits. This makes it a virtually uniform rule, as almost all plagiarism
cases are decided by the federal courts near New York and Hollywood,
the world centers of the publishing and motion picture industries. Al-
though the test has merit, critics have raised the objection that it has
never been adopted by the Supreme Court.5 In addition, most of the
earlier cases applying the ordinary observation test involved patent in-
fringement suits, where the main objective is to prohibit a resemblance
which would deceive purchasers, a protection not necessary for copy-
righted works.50
One proposed alternative to the strict ordinary observer test is con-
tent analysis, which is "a precise research technique for the objective,
systematic, and quantitative as well as qualitative description of the
contents of any sort of communication; newspaper stories, editorials,
etc." 57 Limited to problems of proof regarding content similarity, and
strangely reminiscent of Malevinsky's analytical tests, H content analysis
involves introduction of scientific evidence as to what would be the
actual impression upon an ordinary observer through isolating, classify-
ing and quantitatively inventorying words and themes in the two works.
The result is a statistic representing the probability that such similarity
did not occur by chance. Despite its advantage of reducing an obviously
nebulous concept to a mathematical certainty, content analysis has re-
ceived no immediate embrace by the courts since its inception, prob-
ably because its effect would only cloud the "infallible" perception of
the average viewer. Expert testimony on the likelihood of two songs
being independently composed by two separate musicians has been re-
jected on the grounds that it would invade the province of the court5 9
The connection between this holding and the type of evidence resulting
from content analysis is too obvious to ignore.
54. It has even been held that if the work is intended for children, they must be
included as "average observers." Ideal Top Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
55. Cf. White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1907).
56. In addition, there is the fact that early common law usually referred both works
to a master. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 63 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
57. Sorenson & Sorenson, supra note 15.
58. Id.
59. Overman v. Loessner, 205 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910
(1953).
1968]
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Perhaps the best compromise between the expert witness and the lay
observer is the judge himself, a theory espoused by Judge Yankwich of
the Ninth Circuit.60 Under this theory, the court itself determines the
question of similarity by a comparative analysis of the two themes fol-
lowed by a study of the prior use of similar situations in literature and
the arts. Thus, the judge is placed in the seat of the lay observer, but
he is a more sophisticated, better versed lay observer, and the main
objection to the expert witness disappears."' The question remains,
however, whether the method would be as effective with a less en-
lightened judge on the bench than Judge Yankwich.
STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE
Despite the prevalence of the ordinary observer test and its obvious
corollary that the best evidence of similarity is the two works them-
selves, a discussion of infringement proceedings would be incomplete
without a survey of the standards of evidence used by the courts in
determining the issue of plagiarism. Of course, copying may be shown
by the lifting of a certain scene or incident. When this has occurred,
the problem is easy. But the question becomes more difficult when the
allegation involves paraphrasing, an evil facilitated by the rather large
vocabulary of the English language.2 Here, an imitation of styles or
features would not constitute infringement, but if it is so close as to
appear to be mere evasion, it will be enjoined. Again, the manner of
expression and sequence of incidents will be scrutinized, but it is
enough that points of remarkable identity cover the central features
60. Yankwich, supra note 1.
61. This theory has been adopted in several courts. One such case held that in
determining similarities, a judge is not confined to a comparison of the works in-
volved. He may draw upon his own knowledge of literary matters in determining
whether the pattern is of the type which, having been used in other works, can be
given protection of the copyright law, or whether copying, it any there was, was
permissible or illicit. Expert testimony, even of the highest type, need not be substi-
tuted for the judge's own conclusions arrived at from his own studies of the matter
involved. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 174 F. Supp. 733, 738 (SD. Cal.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 287 F.2d 478 (1959), petition for cert. dismissed, 368
U.S. 801 (1961).
62. Paraphrasing is tantamount to copying in copyright law. Nutt v. Nat'l Institute
for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); Addison-Wesley Pub-
lishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 227-228 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); see Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cit. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
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of both works.63 Similar errors are, of course, a large factor, 64 but less
aesthetic evidence such as an accused infringer's past copying or un-
usual speed in writing has also been proffered.60 Ordinarily, however,
plaintiff's course of action will follow a pattern of point by point simi-
larities.
One example is Burnett v. Lambino,6 6 in which the co-authors of the
play "Shadows in the City" alleged infringement by the book and mo-
tion picture, "Blackboard Jungle." Similarities espoused by plaintiff
included "(a) the confusion at a teacher's first meeting with his class;
(b) a teacher forming an alliance with a class leader; (c) discipline
through physical punishment; (d) a teacher showing the importance
of English in everyday life; . .. (g) an experienced, cynical, unin-
terested teacher given to physical punishment; (h) a sneaky, cunning,
belligerent student, bitter at the world; (i) a school principal who is a
pompous, stupid man, uninterested in teaching problems." '7
Summarily dismissing these contentions, the court asserted that due
to the highly general nature of the similarities, plaintiffs were "on the
wrong side of the vague boundary between 'ideas' and 'expressions'." 68
Of more importance was the similarity of a teaching device used in
both works and the fact that the main character in each case taught in
room 206. Here, however, defendant was allowed to explain the simi-
63. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
64. See Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); W. H. Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas.
26, (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). See also Adventures in Good Eating v. Best
Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942). However, common errors are not con-
clusive evidence. It has been held in an action for infringement on an inflatable
globe map of the world, that four common errors, eleven common selections of un-
common places, and several omissions of important places did not conclusively demon-
strate copying, and plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment. C. S. Hammond &
Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In this
respect, it should be noted that maps as such are entitled to little copyright protec-
tion. Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1960); Amsterdam v. Triangle Publi-
cations, 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951); Marken and Bielfield, Inc. v. Baughman Co., 162
F.Supp. 561 (E.D. Va. 1957).
65. See Scott v. WKJG, 376 F.2d 467 (7th Ci. 1967). Nor are authors above setting
a trap for potential infringers. In R. L. Polk & Co. v. Musser, 105 F.Supp. 351 (E.D.
Pa. 1952), plaintiff had inserted fictitious names and places in its city directory solely
for the purpose of detecting infringement. However, the court held that though the
fictitious names appeared in defendant's competing city directory, there was no in-
fringement, as other evidence clearly negated the influence of substantial copying
throughout the work.
66. 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
67. Id. at 332.
68. Id. at 333.
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larity by proving that he had gotten the idea for his book from his
own teaching experience in a vocational high school, where room 206
was located below a noisy machine shop, which he incorporated into
his work; thus, he chose the room out of fidelity to physical accuracy.
This testimony of defendant's as to why he chose room 206 was then
fortified by showing other instances of literal reproduction in his
novel of actual circumstances and events. It would appear that almost
any evidence which defendant can raise to establish the independent
origin of his work will be given proper credence by the courts.
Conversely, evidence of intent or willingness to infringe may be con-
sidered a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence indicating copying.
Once copying is established, it is immaterial that a defendant could have
created a similar work using elements fairly at his disposal. 69
DAMAGES
Even if the similarity is so great that an inference of copying arises,
there is no infringement unless a "substantial" or "material" portion
of the protected work is appropriated.70 Thus the court, in deciding
whether to give damages, injunction, or no remedy at all, takes into
consideration such things as the decrease in value of the copyrighted
work, whether or not the author's labor has been appropriated, the
value of the part copied, and the relative value and purpose served in
each work by the part copied. Since under the present copyright law
damages can be awarded without banning the defendant's otherwise
original work, varying degrees of appropriation may give rise to vari-
ous amounts of damages short of injunction. A familiar approach ex-
tends itself into another area here, as it has been held in this regard
that there will be no infringement unless the material copied was so
substantial as to be obvious to the "ordinary observer." 71
69. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951);
Davis v. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Alva
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1959): cf. Caldwell-
Clements, Inc. v. Cowan Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
70. Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Macdonald v. Du
Maurier, 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1941);
Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir. 1926).
71. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). Conversely, an appropriation of
a substantial and material part of the protected work constitutes an infringement; it
is not necessary to appropriate all of the work in order to infringe it. Universal Pic-
tures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
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CONCLUSION
Since the first copyright law was enacted, significant changes in
technology have affected its operation. Motion pictures, sound record-
ings, radio and television have developed, and during the past half-
century, a wide range of new techniques for communicating printed
matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use. Sadly,
copyright legislation and judicial construction have failed to keep pace
with the continuing technological revolution in communications. Too
keenly aware of the frequency of baseless claims, current court in-
terpretation has severly restricted the protection of the copyright law,
thus failing to recognize individual authorship for what it is, an in-
dispensable natural resource.
The crux of the problem lies in the strict application of the ordi-
nary observer test, which renders the burden faced by the plaintiff in
infringement proceedings almost insurmountable. Unless the offending
work has completely lifted an entire scene, the creative author has no
chance against a clever paraphraser. As mentioned before, the author's
ordinary course of proof is to bring to the court's attention certain simi-
larities between his work and the defendant's. However, if these simi-
larities are too broad, he will be denied recovery on the grounds that
the matter is not original, as in Burnett 'v. Lambino.72 Conversely, if
the proposed similarities are too narrow, they become expert testimony,
and the author runs afoul of the ordinary observer rule. In one such
case, a plaintiff listed thirty-eight similarities between her unpublished
manuscript "Dancing Cannibale" and the photoplay "The Barefoot
Contessa." 73 The court held that there was no infringement because
... many of the claimed similarities are the result of painstaking,
careful, almost expert analysis by one particularly qualified to make
a comparison. But the test is not whether an expert could dissect
the two works as to be able to demonstrate, by virtue of his
peculiar knowledge that there are similarities prohibited by law,
rather, the similarity must be one that would be apparent upon
ordinary observation.74
This same conclusion has been reached in cases where the number of
72. 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
73. Cantor v. Manldewicz, 203 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1960).
74. Id. at 631.
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alleged similarities was even more substantial, 75 and it is apparent that
the individual author is at the mercy of the large film corporations.
Normally cast in the role of defendant, the film industry is conse-
quently not subject to the ordinary observer test since its main defense
will consist of an attack on the originality of the plaintiff's work. For
this reason, the film corporations utilize their vast resources to retain
"literary detectives," experts who make analytical comparisons of the
contending scripts and (if they decide that there is a chance plaintiff
may be able to bear his burden of similarity) try to search out their
literary antecedents. In this respect, it has been recognized that if a
professional writer were employed to do the copying, an ordinary ob-
server would not notice that one work was taken from another, al-
though a keen critic might.76 As only a few courts have recognized the
ease with which piracy may occur when works are converted from
one medium to another,r r it would appear that the answer lies in re-
vision of the Copyright Act itself.
However, the copyright law would not prosper from more definitive
legislation. As the concept of infringement must necessarily remain
nebulous, the blame for the current lack of copyright protection rests
upon the courts alone.
PAUL E. HOLTZMULLER
75. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 716 (1946).
76. McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F. Supp. 738, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
77. See, e.g., Davis v. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944);
Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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